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FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS
PAUL C. REARDON*

I am impelled to join you this evening, emerging as I do from the
relative obscurity to which I have been so frequently consigned during
the last five years, for a variety of reasons. The first, I suppose, stems
from a sustained interest in the sainted individual whose name your
University bears. I have thought for a long time that the motive and
fortitude which impelled the French Jesuits to prodigies of valor and
performance in opening up the West might well have their uses in
these, our days of divisiveness and turmoil. There is always a need.
for men of character and strength and purpose, no matter what their
points of view. Certainly democracy is best served when argument on
such issues as that which has engrossed us finds in opposing camps
sincere persons of competence who possess in large measure the qualities which so distinguished Jacques Marquette. Indeed, on what was
for me the successful completion of the debates in Chicago on fair trial
and free press in February of last year, I might say to him, "I was
all the more delighted at this good news, because I saw my plans about
to be accomplished and found myself in the happy necessity of expQsing
my life for the salvation of all these tribes." Although he was speaking
primarily of the Illinois, he had in mind also local inhabitants, otherwise undescribed, as far north as Milwaukee.
Secondly, I am happy to be here for I speak to you in the .E.
Harold Hallows Lecture. For a goodly number of years now I have
worked with judges and judicial groups throughout this country and
abroad. In those years I have often been impressed that judicial figures,
nationally known among their fellows for considerable contributions
to the American judiciary and hence the people, often are not fully
recognized in their own jurisdictions for what they are and what they
have done. I am certain this cannot be so in Wisconsin relative to the
Chief Justice. By his initiative and energy the Appellate Judges Conference was founded. That organization now has in its membership
hundreds of the appellate judges of the United States and carries on
programs by which those judges may find self-improvement through
lectures, seminars, and the interchange of ideas and experiences. Ten
years ago there was no vehicle for progress of this sort in existence.
That one exists now, and that every state is able to benefit from it
is due almost solely to the inspiration and effort originally provided
by Chief Justice Hallows. His writings, his cooperation and interest
have made him respected nationwide, and that you named this lecture
after him impelled me more than any other reason to meet with you
this evening.
* Associate Justice, Massachusetts Supreme Court.
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In "Tristam Shandy," Sterne had a comment on a curious practice
of Germany's ancient Goths. "They had," he said, "all of them a wise
custom of debating everything of importance to their state twice, that
is, once drunk and once sober: Drunk, that their councils might not
want vigour; and sober-that they might not want discretion." Since
late 1964 I have been present at a plethora of conferences, meetings,
forums, and what have you, in which the prime topic of attention was
that to what we turn now. I assure you that none of the important
ones was assisted by spiritous lubrication. I cannot vouch for those
on the periphery or for the hundreds, yea thousands, where I was
not privileged to be either a participant or observer.
As I look back over a year it seems to me that the debate which
took place in the House of Delegates on the recommendations of that
Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press was a classic in
every sense of the word. Never in the history of the House had so
many people been on hand. For an entire afternoon under television
lights the committee presented its proposals and sought favorable action from the delegates. Appearing in opposition were representatives
of all of the news media-sincere and knowledgeable men, who endeavored to make a case for delay in adoption and who contested
certain statements and conclusions of the committee. The confrontation was high level in every respect. My own admiration and affection
for the media representatives born of our meetings together over the
preceding forty months was but increased, for notwithstanding our
divergence of view in some, but not too many, respects our meetings
had been frank but friendly, and in no sense marred by rancor. We
both knew we were dealing with grave constitutional problems not to
be resolved by aimless charge and countercharge. The delegates, as
you remember, voted one hundred and seventy-six to sixty-eight to
approve our recommendations and send them along to the appropriate
parties.
My purpose tonight is to discuss with you the current status of
the fair trial-free press question with the experience of a year behind
us. What I have to say is a statement of my individual view. Our
committee has been discharged for a year, and my observations are
personal.
To place them in proper focus it is necessary that I review briefly
the origins of our committee, its study, and what our proposals were.
The first query is logically, "Why was there any need for a study
at all ?" Let us first refer to the shortened language of the two Amendments in the Bill of Rights, the interpretation of which frames the
discussion. The First says, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press." The Sixth proclaims, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
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public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed .

. . ."

Now the year 1964 saw an

intense preoccupation with the implications of these amendments on
the part of many in the legal profession and of many outside of it,
due perhaps in the main to the shambles at Dallas following the assassination of the President. Upon this disaster the Warren Commission opined, "The experience in Dallas during November 22 to 24 is a
dramatic affirmation of the need of steps to bring about a proper balance between the right of the public to be kept informed and the right
of the individual to a fair and impartial trial." No one moving among
the trial judges of the country in recent years could fail to note their
increasing engrossment with day-to-day dilemmas facing them in a
multitude of other and less notorious cases. Nor was this problem
lately contrived. It had been with us for decades. I shall not, as I could,
provide detail on this allegation but a mention of the Hauptmann
case, the Brink's case, and the Sheppard case will recall to your mind
the basis of concern. In two years between January, 1963, and March,
1965, over one hundred reported decisions dealt with the question of
prejudicial publicity. These were often heavily publicized cases, where
the fabric of the administration of criminal justice was placed under
heavy strain. Even a superficial review of fact situations in the examination of jurors in certain cases amply demonstrated what the courts
were up against in trying to procure not ignorant juries but impartial
ones. Lord Coke over three centuries ago declared that as the juror
approached his task he "should stand indifferent as he stands unsworne." Applying the Sixth Amendment does not require jurors with
vacant minds. It seeks only that jurors may come to their duties with
an impartial outlook on the issues involved and with no predispositions.
This then in the briefest outline was the nub of what bothered those
who were bothered by the impact of prejudicial publicity on Sixth
Amendment rights. I may add that those who were gravely disturbed
by such publicity were in the main sufficiently aware that in accommodating both amendments a free press was vital to the democracy
and were thoroughly cognizant of why the First Amendment said what
it did and how it was that its draftsmen came to create it.
And so it was that in 1964 three foundations financed a massive
series of studies on the administration of criminal justice under the
leadership of Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. The Committee on Fair Trial-Free Press which I
was asked to lead was added to the original group of studies dealing
with sentencing, pretrial procedures, and other aspects of the criminal
process as a result of a burgeoning sentiment in that year that at long
last the conundrum of how to effect an accommodation between the
First and Sixth amendments might be solved. Mine was a strong
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committee, comprising as it did federal and state judges, teachers of
the law, and men of extensive and varied experience in the prosecution
and defense of criminal cases. We came together at the end of 1964
and proceeded to the first of a' great number of meetings, many of
which were with representatives of the news media. At our first meeting with them in Washington there was general agreement by all
present that a problem did in fact exist. It appeared logical to move
to isolate it and endeavor to solve it. Certainly our committee with that
objective in mind endeavored to remain during the many months of
our deliberations as open-minded as possible. We assembled, under
the leadership of our Reporter, Professor David L. Shapiro of the
Harvard Law School, a research team. We initiated inquiries among
judges and prosecution and defense counsel throughout the United
States, with particular reference to m&ropolitan areas. I doubt that
there is any case in the area of fair trial-free press anywhere in the
English language that was not reviewed. We subscribed to a selected
but sizeable group of newspapers over lengthy periods of time. We
sent investigators into certain American cities, one a single newspaper town where the-paper subscribed to 'a press-bar code, another
a city in New Jersey where State v. Van Duyne1 had laid down certain
guidelines, and another, San Francisco, a large city with newspapers
in competition and where there were no recognized guidelines. We
talked with leading police officials and law professors, and kept in
touch with state and local bar associations engaged in tackling the
fair trial-free press puzzle at local levels. We met with many judges,
both federal and state. The series of meetings with representatives of
publishers, editors, and the television and radio industries produced
much suggestion which was helpful to us. We sent a research team to
England and carried out studies there. Since we were charged to make
recommendations relative to Canon 20 of the Canons of Legal Ethics, a
canon which had never so far as the reports would indicate been enforced, it is entirely appropriate that I read it to you in the form which
goes back many years: "Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to
pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the
Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.
Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of
a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional
to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not
go beyond quotations from the records and papers on file in the Court;
but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement." The canon was demonstrably weak, inexact, and did not lend
itself to enforcement. The recommendations which came at the end
143 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
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of our studies and which were ultimately adopted in Chicago were
most importantly directed to a. revision of that canon.
Prior to considering the recommendations, I wish to, comment on
our relationships, with the media during the many months of study.
I reiterate that the discussions which we- had with them which we
carried on in a number of cities were held on the friendliest ,of terms
and in the spirit which had been in the mind of the Warren Commission when it urged study. It was my belief over a long period of time
that with some statesmanship among all parties it would be possible
to establish guidelines to which all would agree, and I bent every
effort for over two years to the end that a joint declaration of policy
might be made. Our study demonstrated that the points of difference
between the media and the bar are comparatively few but it was unfortunately impossible to come together on such a joint statement, and
this fact became extremely clear when on October 2, 1966, we released
our recommendations.
The results of our work were contained in a report which with
accompanying -commentary and the product of certain studies comprised 265 pages, but the standards themselves are comparatively brief.
They were directed to lawyers and to law enforcement agencies primarily. I shall review them with you.
, Relative to lawyers, and it is in this field. that we have recommended
a revision of Canon 20, we stated that the duty of the lawyer is not to
release information or opinion if there is a reasonable likelihood that
such dissemination "will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice." We asked the lawyers to refrain
with respect to grand jury or other pending investigations from making
any extrajudicial statement that.goes beyond the public record or that
is not necessary to indicate the fact of an investigation or to obtain
assistance in the apprehension of a suspect. We asked that from the
time of arrest, the issuance of a warrant, or the filing of a complaint
or information or indictment, until the, commencement of trial or disposition without trial, a lawyer, whether he be with the prosecution
or defense, not release details on the accused's prior criminal record,
the existence or content of any confession, the refusal of the accused
to make a statement, the performance of any examination or tests, the
identity or credibility of prospective witnesses, the possibility of a
plea of guilty to the charge, or any opinion on the accused's guilt or
innocence. The foregoing is. the nub of the proposed new canon. We
recognized, however, that the lawyer is free to announce an arrest and
certain circumstances surrounding the arrest; to describe certain physical evidence other than the confession, admission or statement, which
is limited to a description of the evidence seized and the nature of the
charge, and is free also to comment on certain other factors. We sug-
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gested that all of this be wrapped up in a rule of court, as well as
adopted, as it will be now in the new code of professional responsibilities on which work has gone forward for four and a half years. We
further recommended that violations of the standards which I have
described in broad terms should be grounds for reprimand, suspension,
or, in extreme cases, disbarment. All of this constituted Part I of the
recommendations.
Part II recommended the adoption in each jurisdiction by law enforcement agencies of internal regulations paralleling those which we
recommended for lawyers. We were of the opinion that where this was
not done withiry a reasonable time the standards for such agencies should
be made effective by rules of court or by legislative action. As the
result of certain information reaching us we also recommended the
imposition on judges of the duty to refrain from any conduct or the
making of any statement with respect to a pending criminal case that
might tend to interfere with a fair trial.
Additionally, we recommended in Part III that with respect to
pre-trial hearings the defendant might move that all or part of the hearings be held in chambers or otherwise closed to the public, including
the news media, on the ground that evidence or agreement adduced
at the hearing might disclose matters inadmissible at the trial. We left
the closure of such hearings within the discretion of the trial judge,
with the provision that a complete record of the preliminary trial hearing should be kept and made public after the trial or disposition of
the case without trial.
Certain other recommendations in Part III dealing with court procedures which I shall not describe in detail followed in general the
suggestions contained in the Sheppard case, although they had been
roughed out in committee discussions prior to the time that that case
came down. These had to do with change of venue or continuance,
standards for granting motions relative thereto, standards of acceptability of jurors, and conduct of the trial, including use of the courtroom, sequestration of the jury, and the cautioning of witnesses, parties
and jurors. With these recommendations there has been little debate
and I judge that they were generally acceptable.
Finally, we urged a limited use of the contempt power against a
person who disseminates for publication an extra-judicial statement
relating to the defendant or the issues in the case that is willfully designed to affect the outcome of the trial and that seriously threatens
to have such an effect; or against a person who knowingly violates a
judicial order not to disseminate until completion of the trial specified
information referred to in a hearing closed to the public. I emphasize
that this is a very narrow application, indeed, of the inherent power of
contempt which has always been considered to reside in the courts. I
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emphasize, too, that without it the courts would in effect be powerless
to afford an accused the fair trial which he is entitled to receive. The
provisions for contempt which really are peripheral to the main thrust
of our report created great consternation among the media. I suggest
a careful reading of these provisions should offend no one.
These were the recommendations. It is important that they be
understood for what they are. It is equally important that they be
understood for what they are not. In view of the barrage of adverse
editorial comment which followed upon the promulgation first, and the
adoption second, of the recommendations, I should like to tell you what
they are not and what they do not do.
1. They place no restriction on the news media to inhibit publication of essential information about crime and criminal investigations
or the administration of the courts.
2. They do not restrict in any sense full coverage of trials or close
any court records. While prior criminal records of the accused would
not be officially released by prosecutors or law enforcement agencies,
the news media could, if they chose to, publish what their own files
contained.
3. They do not impinge in any way on the freedom of the press
to expose corruption in the administration of public affairs or to criticize the courts on law enforcement.
4. They do not extend the contempt power of the courts but, on
the contrary, narrowly define the areas in which that power is to be
employed.
5. They do not seek to supplant voluntary codes of fair practice in
crime news coverage developed by press-bar groups in a number of
states, but rather serve to complement such codes by clear definition
of the types of potentially prejudicial information which should not be
released between arrest and trial.
6. They are not to be interpreted as providing a cloak of secrecy
for lawyers and law enforcement officials relative to information about
arrests and other steps in the judicial process which should be made
public.
7. They do not restrict in any sense the exercise by the press in its
investigative or "watch dog" roles or its freedom to publish findings
developed through its own initiative.
I have referred to the meetings that we had with representatives
of national organizations of the news media. It is possible now to
designate at least fourteen changes that were made in our recommendations arising from suggestions made at these conferences. We
had, for instance, originally provided that in case of a mistrial stemming
from an extrajudicial statement held to be in contempt of court the
court might require all or part of the proceeds of any fine to be em-
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ployed to reimburse the defendant for additional legal fees or other
expenses fairly attributable to the order that the case be tried in a
different venue or tried again in the same venue. We excised this recommendation in the interest of coming as close as possible to the position
on this point which the media representatives held. It is possible to
cite other similar examples. We made changes where the media's suggestions seemed sound and because we strove mightily to approach the
point of view of the American press as closely as possible. It is to be
emphasized that we did this freely.and subject to no pressures whatever.
If the chorus of editorial condemnation was ample and fortissimo
upon the release of our original draft recommendations in October, 1966,
it swelled to even greater heights in February of 1968. I reviewed several thousand news clips in the days following the action of the House,
and were I not possessed of a naturally sunny and cheerful disposition
I should have been rendered extremely morose indeed. A typical comment was that in the Milwaukee Journal: "Now that it [the American
Bar Association] has come down with fair trial fever it seeks to obstruct
the free flow of public information that is constitutionally proclaimed
vital to a working democracy. The canons have been in growing disrepute anyway for their obsoleteness, unreality, arbitrariness and ineffectiveness. These gravely misguided new ones should not be allowed
to take root. They are not the holy gospel of the subject." I ask you
to make your own judgment of this comment which to me bordered
on the bilious but which I must say in all fairness was quite representative. Yet there were .not a few editorial writers, and some very
good ones, who, while they might have questions on this or that recommendation, were sympathetic to the point of agreement in the main with
what we had proposed and what had been adopted.
Have our proposals taken root, and what has been their fate? Have
they gone down the drain in the torrent of adverse reaction from the
media? Were the months of labor which produced them all in vain?
These are questions which I should like to explore now.
First off, I wish to touch upon the performance of the media in
this, sensitive field in the last year. It is my impression that the press
of. the nation has been taking a hard look at its policies and a great
deal more care in general in what it writes on information in its possession or obtainable in the crucial time span between the commission
of a crime and that point when a defendant charged with the crime
goes on trial. The efforts of the bar to clean up its own house are being
matched, if not exceeded, by efforts on ,the part of many responsible
publishers. In one instance, rather amusing to me, a certain newspaper
has persistently belabored our report and yet issued house instructions
to its personnel setting down guidelines on what and what not to print
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which are possibly more restrictive than we should have wfitten for
the paper in question had we been Asked. Corporate agencies of the
media are joining in the search for voluntary guidelines for press and
bar to which I shall refer again presently. Certain breaches in good
judgment and surrenders of responsibility seem to me to have 'occurred in' certain publications i'elitive to certain cases, breaches which
have greatly complicated the task of the trial judges and juries on
those cases. Size and financial strength possessed by certain media do
not in themselves *convey a carte blanche, and I subscribe to the quaint
notion that they do not combine to relieve those in charge of such
media from all restraint, either that imposed by sweet reason, or, here's
the rub, the law. Of course, it is a possibility, and some are willing
to hazard it as a constitutional fact, that no sanctions at all exist to
check those who wrap themselves in the cloak of the First Amendment
and defy others who try to make the Sixth Amiendment work. I doubt
it, and the day such doubts are 'authoritatively extinguished will be a
sad day in the administration of criminal justice in this country. And
yet, as I have indicated, such extinction does not follow as night the
day from what has gone before. Certainly a responsible and reasonable
attitude on the part of the media, and I reemphasize that there is plenty
of present evidence of this, will aid immeasurably in the accommodation between the two amendments which exists and needs only to be
nurtured a bit to grow to satisfactory strength. Given good will on
all sides there is no necessity for any Armageddon.
Secondly, of great importance was the approval by 'the Judicial Conference of the United States last September of the report
of a distinguished committee of federal judges led by Judge Irving
Kaufman of the Second Circuit. The New York Times hailed the
report as a "notable contribution to establishing a more secure balance
between the constitutional guarantees of fair trial and free press," and
referred to the hope of the Judicial Conference that the news media
"by their self-restraint will obviate the necessity of imposition by the
courts of' direct controls." No one can fault those sentiments. There
were editorial writers and others who sought to drive a wedge between the recommendations of our committee and that of Judge Kaufman, but, as he himself pointed out in a letter to the Times'when his
committee report was first issued, he wished to state in fairness to the
ABA recommendations that his work was "directed at the free pressfair trial dilemma as manifested in the Federal Courts," and that, as
his report had attempted to make clear, the problem in a state court
context to which our reportt also addressed itself was "of a somewhat
different nature." Since one by one the federal courts are now putting
in effect the procedures of the Kaufman Report approved by the Judicial Conference, and this has nationwide effect in those courts, it is
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important to understand the striking similarity between them. The new
federal court standards as they apply to lawyers and court personnel
have incorporated the ABA standards in identical language. By its
approval the Judicial Conference has paralleled the ABA recommendations on (a) the release of prejudicial information by attorneys
on penalty of disciplinary action, (b) the release of such information
by bailiffs, clerks, marshals, and court reporters, and (c) the regulation of the conduct of trials so as to "insulate the proceedings from
prejudicial influences." While the federal report did not enter the
field of closure of preliminary hearings, it pointed out the difference
in practice and experience between state and federal courts in those
fields, and stated that it was desirable to accumulate more experience
in the matter before a formal rule was adopted. Reference was made
to "the established practice in many districts for bench conferences
and conferences in chambers out of the hearing of all persons except
the participants." In this respect the federal practice might be said to
be more restrictive than what we recommended since, while we advocated occasional closure when imperative, we did so on the basis of
the taking of a complete transcript of such hearings, with release of
all material there considered at a time when no prejudice might ensue. One distinction made in the federal report lies in the fact that it
"does not at this time recommend judicially-imposed restrictions on
the release of information by federal law enforcement agencies."
However, as the report makes clear, the federal courts are not under
quite the same necessities as those of the states. The so-called "Katzenbach rules," issued for the Department of Justice in April, 1965, laid
down a code of conduct which is extremely close to the ABA recommendations, with the sole exception that criminal records might be
made available upon specific inquiry. In an address at about the time
the Department policy was announced, Mr. Katzenbach stated that
there was a body of opinion in the Department which was adverse to
such releases, and reconsideration of this position might become necessary at some time. In short, therefore, it can be said that the federal
and ABA reports are on the same wave length and that the state and
federal courts are able to move forward together on the most important
recommendations in each report. This concurrence has not received
general attention but one has only to compare standing orders entered
in some of the federal courts and special orders entered in certain
famous cases in the last year in the state courts to conclude that there
is no real divergence in the objective and practice in each.
Thirdly, another highly important happening has been the recent
submission to the House of Delegates of the ABA of the Code of
Professional Responsibility submitted by the Special Committee on
Evaluation of Ethical Standards which commenced its work in August,
I
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1964, on a replacement of the Canons of Ethics which so badly needed
a completely new look. This report is up for final adoption at the annual meeting of the Association in Dallas in August. It incorporates,
in accordance with the instructing vote of the House of Delegates in
Chicago in February, 1968, the new standard to replace Canon 20,
in the terms in which the standard was drafted by our committee with
certain minor and inconsequential changes in wording to conform it
to the general plan of the new code. When this code is adopted finally,
as it undoubtedly will be, additional muscle will be given to the guidelines for counsel in the fair trial-free press area. The significance of
these steps is very great.
A fourth step in the march to better days can be found in the growing body of case law. While no comprehensive review of the reported
cases in the last year has to my knowledge been made, there have been
a number of decisions in appellate courts which mirror new approaches
to the resolution of fair trial-free press problems based at least in part
on what was recommended. I pause to outline one of these.
Maine & Braun v. The People' was a California case where a change
of venue was sought by mandamus in a case involving "crimes of the
gravest consequence," alleged assaults by two outsiders upon a popular
young couple in the northern California community of Ukiah. The
court found that certain authorities had talked far too freely about the
crimes, to the extent that the existence of a confession became common knowledge in the community. The court ordered a change of
venue on the standard elaborated in our report, which it held was authoritative. The opinion was dealt with harshly by leading California
newspapers, not so much because of the result, but because it had
invoked the ABA report. Nonetheless, it states the law of California.
In my own state, two decisions came down last spring dealing with
contempt proceedings brought against newspapers or their agents. The
language in each of these, in which, incidentally, the defendants were
absolved, should be of general interest.
I have mentioned the issuance of general and special orders of the
federal and state courts on conduct of counsel. A very good sample
of these is that which was promulgated on October 1, 1968, by the
United States District Court in the Eastern Division of the Northern
District of Illinois and which follows literally the language recommended by the federal report as well as by ours. It is safe to say that
even in instances where trial courts are not employing the exact language of the several reports, these are nonetheless having a heavy
effect on the type of order which is issued. Certainly the reports contain much to assist the beleaguered trial judge facing at once an unusu268

Cal. 2d 375, 438 P.2d 372 (1968).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol'. 52

ally troublesome trial, a desire to impanel a jury as impartial as possible, and a heavy interest on the part of the media in all proceedings.
Thus, the lengthy studies and the source materials which they made
available would, it seems to me, have justified themselves by focusing
attention on helpful techniques even had there been no further affirmative action by the American Bar Association or the Judicial Conference of the United States. As Norman Isaacs said in the last issue of
the Harvard Law Review, "The [ABA] report has served very well
indeed the cause of justice in criminal cases by providing the incentive
of reform."
The last year has also produced a fifth movement which is the
growing trend to the adoption of voluntary press bar codes. In April,
1965, the Society of American Newspaper Editors was saying, "We
are persuaded that no set of specific rules can be written into a code
of press conduct that will not do more harm than good. We are convinced that the solution to whatever problems of free press-fair trial
may exist will not be solved by such codes." It would appear that the
editors no longer stand on this position. This is a good augury for the
future. Massachusetts had a code in being as early as 1963. However,
a number of the large metropolitan newspapers have yet to subscribe
to it. Washington and Colorado have drafted codes and in Washington,
particularly, there seems to be general satisfaction with what has been
done. At the moment at least fourteen states and a number of large
cities have put voluntary agreements into effect. Following upon the
adoption of our report and the discharge of our committee a year ago
in Chicago, implementation of the approved recommendations was
placed in the hands of a Legal Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and
Free Press. This successor committee has since been led by Chief
Judge Edward Devitt of the District of Minnesota. When the debates
on our report were being waged, we made it plain that the report
which we had produced was designed to complement and not to supplant codes, and we urged that every possible effort be made to extend
them. The search for solutions through press-bar cooperation has
marked the work of Judge Devitt's committee since its inception.
In an initial statement in April, 1968, Judge Devitt emphasized for
the committee the high desirability of continuing consultation between
press and bar. He further emphasized that the effectiveness of the
codes will turn on the measure of support which they command from
all parties. I arrive in Wisconsin immediately following the publication in the Wisconsin Bar Bulletin for February, 1969, of the Proposed Statement of Principles of the Wisconsin Bar and News Media.
The principles elaborated appear to coincide in general with similar
statements which have been issued elsewhere, and they are to be commended. Construed with the ethical guidelines which should apply to
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counsel in these matters, they should go far to- put at rest those obstacles to a fair trial which have been so bothersome. It is of no great
importance that there may be reasonable differences of opinion on
certain matters of detail. What is important is that the essence 'of a
fair trial can be preserved provided all parties abide by what they have
agreed to establish as principles., It is useless to engage in conference
and drafting exercises unless those so committed leave the end result
with the firm intention of seeing to it that the product is made to work.
Assuming multilateral adoption of the principles, I suggest the real
test might come when you experience your next notorious crime. Then
there will be put up to the bench and bar and the media of this state
the very real launching pad on which you will either abide by what
you have written or will not so abide. If any of those who have the
duty which the Wisconsin principles lay upon them to bring on a
trial unsullied by prejudicial pre-trial publicity commence corner-cutting, then the statement of the principles will emerge as a statement
and nothing more. This is not that for which we all have been striving,
and I need say no more about it.
A sixth and final item which I wish to note is the manual now in
the stages of final preparation and about to be released on a broad scale
throughout the country which has been compiled by Judge Devitt's
committee and which is a complete, and yet not overlong, treatment of
the issues we have been considering. This manual is intended to acquaint all concerned with the intent and limitations of the ABA standards, to clarify for lawyers, law enforcement officers and news media
representatives the types of information which should be released officially, and also those types which the courts have held to be inherently
prejudicial, and to assist bar-media committees in their joint consideration of voluntary codes of fair practice. The manual is directed also
to exercises in teaching programs in law schools and schools of journalism concerned with fair trial and free press. It is, in short, a companion piece for the several reports and the voluntary codes. It has
been carefully constructed and I recommend it to you all.
As you may have gathered, I have talked with you about a delicate
and complex subject. Yet the future appears bright to me. The entire
answer to the problem I have discussed can be. found in the phrase,
"the exercise of responsibility." If the lawyers and the media continue their mutual education, if they continue to talk together, if they
extend and abide by voluntary codes, if the exceptional case receives
careful treatment from all hands, if the trial courts adopt appropriate rules without endeavoring to impose unreasonable restraints, if
the law enforcement agencies strive at once not to make improper
prejudicial material available nor, alternatively, to hide behind standards in a failure to release material which is properly publishable,
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then the progress we have been. seeking is with us. I suggest we have
come a long way in this field in the last five years. More remains to be
accomplished and will be given the healthy motive and the responsible
approach. I return to what our committee said in its first report: "There
need be no basic incompatibility in the application of the First and
Sixth Amendments separately or in tandem." It remains for all concerned to make a sincere effort to prove that fact-an effort which
will require sustained cooperation and interchange. For that price all
our rights and liberties can be made the more secure.

